

DDA 76-5994

DD/A Registry
File *Records*

2 December 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

FROM : John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

John:

1. I am forwarding to your attention a memorandum given me by Bob Gambino on 22 November 1976. It has two current relevancies, one being to the forthcoming document destruction program and the other to a recommendation which I believe is contained in the Inspector General's Survey Report of the Office of Security.

2. It appears to me what may be involved here is a lack of either communications or understanding, and I appeal to the last indented subparagraph of paragraph 2. Speaking for the Directorate there is no way we can possibly allot 13, or any, new positions to the Office of Security to move on with this program.

3. The Office of Security is now in the process of commenting on your draft of their survey report. I am sure they will reflect in that document the same thoughts as reflected in the attachment. I did, however, want to get this to your attention at this time.

/s/ John F. Blake

John F. Blake

Att

DDA 76-5817 Memo to DDA fr D/OS; dtd 22 Nov 76;

Subj: Identification of Illegally-Held Information
to be Destroyed

Distribution:

Orig - IG w/Orig of Att

1 - D/OS w/o att

~~1~~ - DDA Subject w/~~o~~ att

1 - DDA Chrono w/o att

1 - JFB Chrono w/o att

DDA:JFBBlake:der (2 Dec 1976)

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP79-00498A000600060020-7

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22 NOV 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM : Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

SUBJECT : Identification of Illegally-Held
Information to be Destroyed

REFERENCE : Memo to DDA from IG, dated
8 November 1976, same Subject (attached)

1. This memorandum is for your information only and expresses this Office's concern over the tone and content of reference (attached).

2. Although this Office has not yet received the long-awaited IG report, a document expected here for several months, a reading of reference makes clear that a major misunderstanding is operating and deserves rapid corrective action. The misunderstanding has three points of conflict:

--This Office, recognizing that there is some legal opinion that would disagree, does not feel it proper to categorize any of our holdings as illegal. We have some file holdings that are obsolete. We have some file holdings that are trivial and hence, practically speaking useless. We have some file holdings that are technically excessive in terms of the Agency's security/counterintelligence needs. But from neither a security nor a legal standpoint do I perceive any of our holdings as illegal. I say this after countless reviews of the Privacy Act.

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- Second, this Office never recommended any kind of crash project to handle the purging and pruning of our records. What actually happened was that we were asked by IG representatives for an estimate of the resource implications if the Office were required to go this route as opposed to the "as time allows" approach. We said, after considerable deliberation, that thirteen people working two years was our estimate of what it would take to do the job without intolerable disruption to our regular operations.
- Even in talking about the thirteen persons/ two years we made it clear, or so I thought, that we would have to have thirteen new positions to handle it. We cannot take it out of our own hide without serious implications to other programs and priorities. I see no hint of IG appreciation of that point in reference.



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4. As a final point, I am certain that many intelligence and national security agencies have record problems

of this type that outdistance ours by a great margin. I am equally certain that their attack on the problem, barring some strong mandate to the contrary from the Department of Justice, will be on an "as time allows" basis.

5. As to our current planning and activities, we have already identified approximately twenty categories of files as clearly appropriate for destruction beyond those linked to the [REDACTED] and operating against these twenty categories, have earmarked approximately 22,000 security files for ultimate destruction. We anticipate more categories will be identified following further analytical work by our Personnel Security and Investigations Directorate. While our efforts so far in this area have been limited to our Security Records Division, we plan before long to task all security file users to help with the gigantic task of spotting hits against the criteria.

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
[REDACTED]

Robert W. Gambino


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8 November 1976



ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: John H. Waller
Inspector General

SUBJECT: Identification of Illegally-Held
Information to be Destroyed

1. Certain files held by the Office of Security, which are technically illegal, have been identified and can be readily destroyed once the present Senate moratorium and other legal constraints on their destruction are lifted. There are, of course, a great many more which have not been identified. I understand that the Director of Security has advised you of the resource impact of various plans for reviewing OS files and purging them of this illegally or improperly held information. The Office of Security feels that a two-year, 13-man, six-months program would be the most realistic one and has recommended this approach.

2. I have already informed the Intelligence Oversight Board that it will be a major undertaking for CIA to purge its files of illegally held information. I am prepared to advise it that any purge plan which promises compliance within less than two years would involve an unacceptable level of disruption to our security and counterintelligence missions.

3. Considering the magnitude of the identification and destruction job which faces us when the moratorium is lifted, and the need then to do as much as we realistically can to be in compliance, I believe that the Office of Security should begin to make a maximum effort to identify files for ultimate destruction, implementing its recommended 13-man approach.


John H. Waller

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

DDA Registry
Records

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

John H. Waller
Inspector General
2 E 24 Hqs.

NO.

STATINTL

DATE

6 NOV
8 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. ED/DDA

TUBE: BX-4

11/9

to 6

2.

ADDA

10 NOV 1976

3

Boh

3.

DDA

10 NOV 1976

3

Boh

4.

STATINTL

10 NOV 1976

5.

D/OS

6.

Att: Mr. Goulson

7.

8.

9.

Att: DDA 76-5544 Memo to DDA fr IG, dtd 8 Nov 1976
Subj: Identification of Illegally Held

10.

Information to be Destroyed

Distribution:

Orig - D/OS w/Orig Att

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- 1 - DDA Subject w/cy Att
- 1 - DDA Chrono w/cy Att
- 1 - JFB Chrono w/o cy Att

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DDA:JFBlake:der (10 November 1976)

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
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
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USE ONLY

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
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

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